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Abstract
It is a well-known empirical regularity that small fi rms are less productive than large fi rms. 
However, does size cause productivity or vice versa? Using matching methods, I fi nd that 
productivity shocks are followed by signifi cant increases in size defi ned by employment. In 
contrast, size shocks are not followed by productivity gains at the fi rm level. This fi nding 
casts doubt on the conventional wisdom that aggregate productivity in Spain is driven 
by a fi rm size distribution biased towards small fi rms in comparison with other developed 
countries. According to my fi ndings, low fi rm-level productivity might play a crucial role in 
shaping the Spanish fi rm size distribution.
Keywords: fi rm-level data, productivity, size distribution.
JEL classifi cation: L11, L25, D24.
Resumen
Las pequeñas empresas son menos productivas que las grandes empresas. Asimismo, las 
empresas españolas son más pequeñas y menos productivas que sus homólogas europeas. 
Sin embargo, ¿son menos productivas porque son más pequeñas o son más pequeñas 
porque son menos productivas? Este trabajo trata de dar respuesta a esta pregunta 
estimando la dirección de causalidad entre productividad y tamaño empresarial mediante 
técnicas de matching y explotando microdatos de empresas españolas. Los resultados 
indican que incrementos de productividad son seguidos por aumentos signifi cativos en el 
tamaño empresarial medido por el número de empleados. Por el contrario, no se observan 
ganancias de productividad tras episodios de aumentos en el tamaño empresarial. Este 
hallazgo cuestiona el consenso establecido de que la baja productividad agregada en 
España se debe a un exceso de empresas pequeñas en comparación con otros países 
europeos. De acuerdo con mi interpretación de la evidencia empírica presentada en este 
trabajo, la baja productividad de las empresas españolas, tanto pequeñas como grandes, 
podría ser la principal causante del excesivo número de empresas pequeñas y, por tanto, de 
la baja productividad agregada.
Palabras clave: productividad empresarial, tamaño empresarial.
Códigos JEL: L11, L25, D24.
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1 Introduction
In Spain and other Southern European countries there is a large number of small firms in compar-
ison to other developed economies. On the other hand, it is well-known that large firms are more
productive than small ones (see Section 3). As a result, it is typically argued that a firm size dis-
tribution biased towards small firms is at the root of the low productivity growth in the South of
Europe. Understanding the obstacles to firm growth in those countries is thus at the center of the
policy debate (IMF (2015)). For instance, Guner, Ventura, and Xu (2008) show that size-dependent
policies, by preventing most productive firms to grow, can potentially explain a high fraction of the
aggregate TFP differences across countries. However, Gourio and Roys (2014), Garicano, LeLarge,
and Van-Reenen (2015) and Garc´ıa-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2014) have found modest effects when
evaluating real size-dependent policies in France and India.
This paper argues that low firm-level productivity may also generate a firm size distribution
biased towards small firms. Canonical models of firm growth characterize industries as groups of
heterogeneous-productivity firms under the assumption that they learn about their productivity as
they operate in the market (see for instance Jovanovic (1982); Melitz (2003)). Firms maximize profits
choosing the level of employment (and capital) given their productivity shocks, which are assumed
to be exogenous. Low productivity firms are less likely to survive and thrive than their more efficient
counterparts. This type of models rationalize the positive association between size and productivity
by implicitly imposing that causality goes from productivity to employment. Under this hypothesis,
the presence of a high number of small firms should be interpreted as the consequence rather than
the cause of their low productivity.
On the empirical front, little is known about the direction of causality in the size-productivity
nexus at the firm level. While there is a wide literature on the determinants of firm growth in
terms of employment (e.g. Henrekson and Johansson (2010); Lopez-Garcia and Puente (2012)),
studies analyzing the relationship between productivity and employment growth are scarce and
provide contradicting results. Daunfeldt, Elert, and Johansson (2010) find that neither high-growth
employment is associated to high-growth productivity nor the reverse. They conclude that a trade-off
exists between employment and productivity. On the other hand, Du, Gong, and Temouri (2013)
find that firms which exhibit higher productivity growth are more likely to become high-growth firms
in terms of turnover and that high-growth firms are more likely to experience higher productivity
growth in the future.
This paper provides evidence in favor of the hypothesis that firm productivity shocks generate
firm growth but not the other way around. In particular, I consider two different treatment variables.
First, I consider high-growth in terms of (employment) size as the treatment status and productivity
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growth as the outcome variable. Second, I consider high-growth productivity as the treatment and
employment growth as the outcome. In the baseline specification, high-growth episodes are defined
as productivity or employment growth above 10% in a given year. Needless to say, both treatments
are far from an experimental setting, which threatens the causal interpretation of the estimates.
For instance, one can interpret high employment growth as a proxy for demand shocks, but a pure
demand shock may also generate a large increase in productivity that will be ambiguously labeled
as a TFP shock in this paper. Unfortunately, the lack of exogenous TFP shocks observable to the
econometrician precludes the consideration of treatment assignments independent of firm observable
and unobservable characteristics.
I attempt to control for reverse causality and self-selection by using matching techniques that are
able to account for observable characteristics but ignore selection on unobservables (e.g. I cannot
rule out the existence of demand shocks simultaneously affecting employment and TFP growth).
Having these concerns in mind, I estimate the effects up to five years after each treatment. The esti-
mated effects indicate that high-productivity growth is followed by statistically significant increases
in size/employment growth; in contrast, employment growth is not followed by subsequent gains in
productivity. These opposite patterns are reassuring. Selection on unobservables and reverse causal-
ity would imply, among other things, the presence of a third omitted factor simultaneously causing
subsequent increases in size and TFP, e.g. a demand shock. Under this demand shock scenario, the
positive association between size and TFP growth would show up regardless of which increase (either
TFP or size) takes place in the first place. Therefore, I argue that my estimates provide suggestive
evidence in favor of the hypothesis that TFP growth causes employment growth but not the other
way around.
I label this pattern as growing by learning because those firms learning about their higher effi-
ciency levels are those that happen to grow more; under this hypothesis, the process of learning and
innovation can be interpreted as the mechanism that makes firms thrive as it is usually assumed
in models of firm dynamics. According to the growing by learning hypothesis, Spanish firms are
smaller because their productivity is lower. This finding raises an obvious question: Why do Spanish
firms have worse abilities to convert inputs into output? Based on the survey by Syverson (2011),
I highlight the potential role of managerial talent, quality of inputs, and R&D activities. Available
cross-country evidence reveals that Spanish firms perform substantially worse than their EU4 coun-
terparts in all the three factors, which may explain, at least partially, their dismal performance in
terms of productivity.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Spanish firm-level data.
Section 3 documents the existence of a positive association between size and productivity at the firm
level together with the fact that Spanish firms are less productive than their European counterparts.
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Then, Section 4 presents the econometric methodology in detail, the main results regarding the
growing by learning hypothesis as well as some robustness exercises. In Section 5, I discuss the
implications of the growing by learning estimates for Spanish firms as well as the potential sources
behind their low productivity in comparison to their EU4 counterparts. Some concluding remarks
are provided in Section 6.
2 Data
I use a firm-level dataset which contains information of a representative sample of Spanish non-
financial companies from 2000 to 2007. The sample contains an average number of 497,782 firms per
year. This database is named Central Balance Sheet Data —or Central de Balances Integrada (CBI)
in Spanish— and is provided by the Banco de Espan˜a. This dataset covers not only manufacturing
but also services, construction and trade sectors.
The database is comprised of two complementary datasets. The first one —Central de Balances
Anual (CBA)— is based on a standardized voluntary survey handled to companies at the time of re-
questing compulsory accounting information. Each year, around 9,000 companies fill this survey. The
information gathered is very detailed, but the sample size is low and big firms are over-represented.
The second dataset —Registros Mercantiles (CBB)— contains the balance sheets of a much larger
number of companies. It originates from the firms’ legal obligation to deposit their balance sheets
on the Mercantile Registry. Therefore, coverage is much wider.
The Bank of Spain Central Balance Sheet Office is in charge of collecting and cleaning these
datasets. All of the variables contained in the latter database are also included in the former. For
each firm, I observe its revenue, total wage bill, employment, book value of the capital stock (both
physical and intangible), expenses in intermediate goods, and sector of activity at the 4-digit level
(according to the NACE rev. 2 classification). Since most of the variables are recorded in nominal
terms, I employ sector-specific deflators for capital and value added to compute real values with 2000
as the base year.1 Using the information above, I also compute firm-specific measures of total factor
productivity (see Appendix A for details). Finally, for some estimations I also consider the exporter
status of each firm taken from the micro data used by the Banco de Espan˜a to construct the official
Spanish Balance of Payments. This dataset, which accounts for 97 per cent of aggregate Spanish
exports in 2007, contains information on firms making transactions with foreign agents if they are
worth more than e 12,000 and are performed through a bank (e 50,000 from 2008 on). Ramos and
Moral-Benito (2013) provide more information on this dataset.
1I take the capital deflators from Mas, Pe´rez, and Uriel (2013) and the value added deflator from Spanish National
Accounts. Both sets of deflators are constructed at the 2-digit NACE classification.
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Despite firms have the legal obligation to submit their statements, some observations are missing
from my data because firms deposit their balance sheets late or on paper form, in which case they
may not have been digitized. Panel A of Table 1 illustrates the size distribution of firms in my
raw sample for the year 2001. The table also compares this distribution with that obtained from the
Central Business Register available from the National Statistics Institute, which contains employment
information for the universe of Spanish firms. There are two important aspects to highlight. First,
the coverage of my raw sample is remarkably large in terms of both the number of firms (56% of
the operating firms in Spain) and the level of employment (54% of total employment). Second, my
sample provides an excellent representation of the firm size distribution in Spain. In particular, small
firms (less than 10 employees) account for 83.90% of the total number of firms and 20.47% of the
employment in my sample versus 83.07% and 20.23% in the population. At the other extreme, large
firms (more than 200 employees) represent less than 0.5% of the total number of firms both in my
sample and in the population, while they account for 33.47% of the employment in my sample and
32.13% in the population.
Table 1: Size distribution of firms in my sample and in the census.
Central Balance Sheet Dataset Central Business Register
Firms Labor Firms Labor
Employees Total (#) Share (%) Total (#) Share (%) Total (#) Share (%) Total (#) Share (%)
PANEL A: Raw Sample
0-9 406,924 83.90 941,897 20.47 715,795 83.07 1,718,600 20.23
10-19 41,664 8.59 583,312 12.68 77,372 8.98 1,050,038 12.36
20-49 27,125 5.59 828,714 18.01 46,683 5.42 1,400,422 16.49
50-199 8,064 1.66 707,535 15.38 17,781 2.06 1,596,481 18.79
+200 1,245 0.26 1,540,260 33.47 4,082 0.47 2,728,958 32.13
All 485,022 100.00 4,601,718 100.00 861,713 100.00 8,494,499 100.00
PANEL B: Final Sample
1-9 249,770 76.34 907,098 20.00 531,399 78.46 1,718,600 20.23
10-19 41,272 12.62 577,844 12.74 77,372 11.42 1,050,038 12.36
20-49 26,919 8.23 822,699 18.14 46,683 6.89 1,400,422 16.49
50-199 7,984 2.44 700,565 15.44 17,781 2.63 1,596,481 18.79
+200 1,219 0.37 1,528,178 33.69 4,082 0.60 2,728,958 32.13
All 327,164 100.00 4,536,384 100.00 677,317 100.00 8,494,499 100.00
Notes. Figures refer to the year 2001. Self-employed persons are not included.
From this original sample I drop observations with missing or non-positive values for the number
of employees, value added, or capital stock. I also eliminate observations at the top and bottom 1%
of these variables. I also exclude firms with 0 employees because these firms represent mostly firms
with no production, being created merely for tax purposes.2 I am left with around 350,000 firms
2Notice that these firms are not self-employed people, which are not covered in out dataset.
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per year distributed across 518 4-digit industries. In Panel B of Table 1 I compare this sample to
the population of firms in the Central Business Register, from which I have also deleted firms with
0 employees. The screening strategy has minor effects in the distributions of firms and employment,
and the representativeness of my final sample remains noticeably good.3
3 The Size-Productivity Nexus
Small firms are less productive than larger ones. Table 2 confirms this fact for my sample of Spanish
firms. Relative to the firms with 1-9 employees, firms with more than 250 employees are roughly 1.83
log points more productive (i.e. 208 per cent more productive) according to the figures in Column
(1). This figure implies a TFP ratio of e1.83 = 6.23, which indicates that the average firm with more
than 250 employees makes around six times as much output with the same measured inputs as the
average firm with 1-9 employees. Also, firms with between 50-249 employees are roughly 105 per cent
more productive than firms with between 1 and 9 employees, implying a TFP ratio of 2.5. Finally,
firms with 20-49 and 10-19 employees are 67 and 41 per cent more productive than firms with 1-9
employees, which implies TFP ratios of 1.80 and 1.43, respectively. These differences cannot be
explained by differences in the size distribution of firms across industries or years since they remain
very similar when I regress log TFP on a set of size dummies accounting for 2-digit industry and
year dummies in Column (2). Finally, Columns (3)-(6) report the same figures for each main sector
of activity confirming the patterns discussed above.
Table 2: Average productivity by size class.
Overall Overall Manufacturing Construction Trade Services
Size class (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1− 9 0.88 1.10 1.03 0.55 1.02 0.81
10− 19 1.24 1.46 1.38 0.86 1.36 1.29
20− 49 1.48 1.68 1.61 1.09 1.55 1.58
50− 249 1.81 2.01 2.09 1.37 1.86 1.71
+250 2.71 2.84 3.02 2.51 2.68 2.34
Dummies NO YES NO NO NO NO
Notes. Figures refer to average log total factor productivity (TFP) measured at the firm level as described in
Appendix A. Dummies refer to the inclusion of 2-digit industry and year dummies in a regression of log TFP on a
set of size dummies. The sample covers the period 2000-2007.
In addition to the descriptive statistics reported in Table 2, the size-productivity nexus is also
illustrated by the correlation between log employees and log TFP, which is 0.33 (t − stat = 12.59).
This correlation remains positive, large, and statistically significant when I account for a set of
3This is true for all years between 2000 and 2007 as illustrated in Figure B.1 in the Appendix.
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industry and year dummies: 0.32 with t−stat = 23.34. I next compute the quintiles of TFP and size
by industry and year confirming that firms is higher quintiles of TFP tend to be in higher quintiles
of size. For instance, around 40% of the firms in the first quintile of TFP belong to the first size
quintile while only 5% belong to the fifth size quintile. These figures imply that among the 20% most
productive firms, 40% are also among the largest 20% while only 5% are among the smallest 20%.
Finally, Figure 1 illustrates that the whole distribution of productivity is shifted to the right for
large firms, which implies that average figures reported above are not driven by a handful of outliers.
Moreover, dispersion seems to be larger in the group of firms with more than 50 employees. This
pattern is also documented by Farinas and Huergo (2015) for a sample of OECD countries using the
OECD compendium of productivity indicators (see Figure 5.1 in Farinas and Huergo (2015)).
Figure 1: Distribution of productivity by size class in Spain
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
−2 0 2 4 6
log TFP
1−9 10−19 20−49 50−249 +250
Notes. This figure plots the distribution of log TFP of Spanish firms over the
period 2000-2007 by size class. The five size categories reported are: (1) from 1 to
9 employees; (2) from 10 to 19 employees; (3) from 20 to 49 employees; (4) from
50 to 249 employees; (5) more than 250 employees. The distribution is estimated
by means of an epanechnikov kernel function using the optimal bandwidth that
minimizes the mean integrated squared error.
3.1 Spanish Firms in the EU Context
In terms of cross-country data, the Spanish firm size distribution is biased towards small firms in
comparison to other developed countries. For instance, firms with less than 9 employees account for
41% of total employment in Spain while this figure is 20% in Germany and 32% in France.4 On the
4See OECD Entrepreneurship at a Glance (2014) available at http://goo.gl/501vw3.
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other hand, Spanish firms are also less productive than their European counterparts on average. For
instance, average labour productivity of Spanish firms is e 39,140 while this figure is e 51,610 for
Germany and e 53,820 for France.5 The combination of these two results provides further evidence
in favour of the size-productivity nexus based on cross-country variation of micro-level data.
In light of the positive association between size and productivity, it is typically argued that the
large number of small firms in comparison with other developed economies is at the root of the low
productivity growth in Spain (e.g. IMF (2015)). However, the evidence in Figure 2 casts doubt on
this conclusion since Spanish firms are less productive than their European counterparts for all size
classes. This Figure shows four different measures of productivity by firm size in Spain relative to
the other EU4 countries (Germany, France, and Italy).6 First, I compute firm-specific TFP for the
four countries as described in Appendix A but using the Amadeus database. In particular, I follow
the approach in Gal (2013) to ensure comparability of such productivity measures across countries.
Second, I use the same TFP measure taken from the ECB’s CompNet database that includes a usable
sample of firms with more than 20 employees (see Lopez-Garcia, di Mauro, and Others (2015)).
Third, I consider labour productivity, measured as value added per employee, from EUROSTAT’s
Structural Business Statistics (SBS). Fourth, I use labour productivity from an alternative source,
the Entrepreneurship at a Glance (2014) report by the OECD. In all the four cases, Figure 2 reports
the ratio of average productivity in Spain to average productivity in the remaining EU4 countries.
Moreover, I consider five size categories: (1) from 1 to 9 employees; (2) from 10 to 19 employees; (3)
from 20 to 49 employees; (4) from 50 to 249 employees; (5) more than 250 employees. All the ratios
refer to the total economy including manufacturing, trade, construction and services.
One lesson emerges from Figure 2. Spanish firms are less productive than their European coun-
terparts at all size categories and for all the four measures of productivity (i.e. the ratio is lower than
1 in all cases). For instance, labour productivity of Spanish firms with 1-9 employees (group 1) is
19% lower than the corresponding EU4 average according to EUROSTAT and 36% lower according
to the OECD. In the case of large firms with more than 250 employees (group 5), Spanish firms’
labour productivity is 12% and 17% lower according to EUROSTAT and the OECD. Turning to total
factor productivity, the productivity of Spanish firms in group 3 (20-49 employees) is 38% and 53%
lower than their EU4 counterparts according to AMADEUS and COMPNET, respectively. Large
firms in group 5 (more than 250 employees) are 31% and 22% less productive in Spain. Finally, it is
worth mentioning that these figures remain qualitatively unchanged when looking at sector-specific
ratios (see Figure B.2). To sum up, the productivity of Spanish firms is lower for all size categories.
5See EUROSTAT Structural Business Statistics (SBS) available at http://goo.gl/FDFj9G.
6The lack of firm-level data precludes the consideration of a larger set of countries for the four measures analyzed
here.
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Figure 2: Spain-to-EU4 productivity ratio by firm size
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Notes. Each bar plots the ratio of average productivity in Spain to average productivity in the remaining EU4 countries
(Germany, France, and Italy). The five size categories reported are: (1) from 1 to 9 employees; (2) from 10 to 19
employees; (3) from 20 to 49 employees; (4) from 50 to 249 employees; (5) more than 250 employees. AMADEUS and
COMPNET refer to total factor productivity ratios, while EUROSTAT and OECD refer to labour productivity ratios
(see the main text for more details). AMADEUS and COMPNET figures refer to the period 2004-2012. EUROSTAT
covers the period 2002-2013, and OECD refers to the year 2011. All the figures refer to the total economy including
manufacturing, trade, construction and services.
However, the productivity gap is smaller for large firms.
4 Growing by learning vs. Learning by growing
In order to graphically inspect whether firms grow once they enjoy a positive productivity shock,
Figure 3 plots on the horizontal axis a time scale which is zero for the period where firms are hit by
the productivity shock. These firms are labeled as High Productivity Growth (HPG). To be more
concrete, HPG firms are those with TFP growth above 10% in 2003, which roughly corresponds to
the 85th percentile in this year. The remaining firms are labeled as “No HPG” in the same year. On
the vertical axis I plot average log size for these two different groups before and after 2003. We can
see that after four years firms hit by a TFP shock are 17% larger. In contrast, firms in the control
group are slightly smaller over the same four years. Moreover, Figure 3 illustrates than HPG firms
are smaller than non-HPG firms before they receive the shock but become larger afterward.
I label the pattern depicted in Figure 3 as growing by learning because those firms learning how
to improve their production strategies are those that happen to grow more; under this hypothesis,
the process of learning and innovation can be interpreted as the mechanism that makes firms thrive.
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Figure 3: TFP shock at s = 0 and subsequent size growth
3.
1
3.
15
3.
2
3.
25
lo
g 
S
iz
e
−4 −2 0 2 4
scale
High productivity growth (HPG) No HPG
Notes. HPG firms are those with TFP growth above 10% in 2003, labeled as s = 0.
The remaining firms are labeled as “No HPG” in the same year. The vertical axis plots
average log size for these two different groups before and after 2003.
Indeed, the learning by growing hypothesis is implicitly assumed in theoretical models of firm dynam-
ics that characterize industries as groups of heterogeneous-productivity firms (e.g. Jovanovic (1982);
Melitz (2003)). These models assume that firms learn about their productivity as they operate in
the market. Low productivity firms are less likely to survive and thrive than their more efficient
counterparts.
Learning by growing represents an alternative rationale to explain the size-productivity nexus.
This would indicate that once the firms grow, they become more productive. The economic foun-
dations for this alternative hypothesis are difficult to motivate. The standard profit maximization
problem establishes that firms chose their input mix given their productivity shocks. It is question-
able to assume that firms chose their productivities given their level of inputs, labor and capital.
Indeed, Figure B.3 in the Appendix provides little evidence in favor of this hypothesis. Analogous
to Figure 3, Figure B.3 plots the evolution of log TFP before and after an increase in size (number
of employees) in 2003. High size growth (HSG) firms do not appear to experience productivity gains
after the increase in size.
In any event, the remaining of the paper aims to formally test these two hypotheses using the
sample of Spanish firms described above.
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4.1 Econometric Approach
I test for the growing by learning (GBL) and learning by growing (LBG) hypotheses by creating con-
trol groups using matching techniques based on average treatment models as discussed in Heckman,
Ichimura, and Todd (1997). The intuition of this technique is to estimate the effect of productivity
(size) growth on size (productivity) growth by matching high-growth-productivity (-size) firms with
non-high-growth-productivity (-size) firms. The method constructs a counterfactual which allows
analyzing how size (productivity) of a firm would have evolved if it had not received a productivity
(size) shock. This counterfacual is based on matching the high-growth-productivity (size) firm with
a control group of similar characteristics that do not receive the productivity (size) shock.
I consider two parallel empirical specifications throughout this section: (i) one in which the
treatment variable is a productivity shock and the outcome of interest is size growth (growing by
learning — GBL); (ii) another one in which the treatment status is defined by a size/employment
shock and the outcome variable is productivity growth (learning by growing — LBG).
In order to formally introduce the approach, I first rescale the time periods in such a way that
a firm receives the productivity (size) shock at s = 0.7 Let yis be the outcome at time s —either
productivity growth or size growth— of firm i at period s. The variable HGFi takes the value one
if a firm i receives a productivity (or size) shock at s = 0. In the baseline estimation, a firm is
labeled as a high growth firm if its productivity (or size) growth is above the 75th percentile, which
roughly corresponds to an annual growth rate above 10% in both cases. Also, I restrict the sample
to firms with more than 10 employees in order to reduce the over-representation of small firms in the
population of high-growth firms.8
The causal effect can be verified by looking at the average effect of interest:
E
(
y1is − y0is|HGFi = 1
)
= E
(
y1is|HGFi = 1
)− E (y0is|HGFi = 1
)
(1)
where the superscript denotes whether firm i received a shock at s = 0 or not. In particular, y1is is
the outcome if firm i receives a shock while y0is denotes the outcome of firm i if it does not receive
the shock. Therefore, the crucial problem in this analysis is that the second term in equation (1) is
not observable. This is the effect that high growth firms would have experienced, on average, had
they not received the shock. In order to identify this term I assume that all differences between
high growth firms and the appropriate control group can be captured by a vector of observables
7I follow the strategy proposed by DeLoecker (2007) when estimating the productivity gains of exporting.
8A widely used definition of high-growth firms establishes that average employment growth must exceed 20% per
year over a three-year period and the firm must have 10 or more employees at the start of the period. I do not
consider this type of multi-period definition because the balancing hypothesis is not satisfied when using this criterion
as explained below.
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including the pre-shock size and productivity of a firm. For that purpose, I apply the propensity
score matching method (see Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983))9 which provides me with an appropriate
control group that is as close as possible to the high growth firm in terms of its predicted probability
to receive a high growth/productivity shock.
To be more concrete, I model the probability of becoming a high growth firm (the propensity
score) as follows:
Pr (HGFi,0 = 1) = Φ [h(yi,−1, Xi,−1)] (2)
where Φ(·) refers to the normal cumulative distribution function. The subscript 1 denotes that the
probability of being a high growth firm is regressed on variables prior to s = 0. I take a full polynomial
in the elements of h(·) as to free up the functional form and improve the resulting matching (Woolridge
(2002)). The lagged outcome variable yi,−1 is included as a pre-treatment control together with other
relevant firm-level covariates, namely, total factor productivity, size, export status, wages, and age.
Finally, I estimate the propensity score by year and 2-digit NACE industry to control for common
aggregated demand and supply shocks. Let the predicted high growth firm probability be denoted
by pi.
10
The matching is based on the method of the nearest neighbor, which selects a non high growth firm
j which has a propensity score pj closest to that of the corresponding high growth firm (Becker and
Ichino (2002) provide more details on this matching procedure). More concretely, I match within
each year and 2-digit NACE sector and therefore create control groups within narrowly defined
sectors. This matching strategy results in a group of matched HGF and non HGF firms that allows
me to evaluate the causal impact of (i) productivity shocks on size growth, and, (ii) size shocks on
productivity growth.
Having established a matched sample of treated (HGF) and control (non HGF) firms, I use a
difference-in-differences (DID) methodology to estimate the effects of interest. In particular, every
HGF firm i is matched with a group of N ci control firms denoted as C(i). The weight of each control
firm in the group of controls for the treated firm i is given by wij =
1
Nci
if j ∈ C(i) and zero otherwise.
Moreover, I define y1 and yc as the estimated outcomes of the treated and the controls, respectively.
Armed with these ingredients, I consider the following estimator in the spirit of DeLoecker (2007):
βsh =
1
Ns
∑
i
⎛
⎝y1is −
∑
j∈C(i)
wijy
c
js
⎞
⎠ (3)
9This method boils down to estimating a probit model with a dependent variable equal to 1 if a firm is a high
growth firm and zero elsewhere on lagged observables.
10The balancing hypothesis states that for a given propensity score pi, exposure to treatment is random and thus
treated and control units should be on average observationally identical. In order to corroborate that this assumption
is satisfied in my application, I perform the algorithm described in Becker and Ichino (2002).
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where h denotes the hypothesis being tested, either growing by learning effect (h = GBL) or learning
by growing effect (h = LBG). In the case h = GBL, the matching is performed considering as HGF
firms those with high productivity growth while the matching is based on high size growth firms for
the case h = LBG. In both cases, the matching is performed at the time a firm receives the shock
and s = 1, ..., S denotes the time periods after the shock (s = 0). Therefore, βsh estimates the effect
at every period s after the shock. The outcome variable of interest, yis, can be either productivity
growth or size growth.
In addition to the impact effect estimated by βsh, I also consider the cumulative effect gathered
over a period S after the shock:
βSh =
1
NS
∑
i
⎛
⎝
S∑
s=0
y1is −
S∑
s=0
∑
j∈C(i)
wijy
c
js
⎞
⎠ (4)
In words, βSh in equation (4) measures the productivity/size gains that HGF firms gather over S
periods whereas βsh in equation (3) estimates the gain at each period s.
4.2 Baseline Results
The estimated growing by learning (GBL) and learning by growing (LBG) effects are reported in
Table 3. Rows (a) and (b) refer to the growing by learning hypothesis. In row (a) I present the
impact of a productivity shock on employment growth at every period s, whereas row (b) shows the
cumulative employment growth effect, reflecting the size growth premium gathered after S periods.
Rows (c) and (d) refer to the learning by growing hypothesis. Row (c) presents the estimated impact
effects of an employment shock on productivity growth at every period s after the shock, whereas
row (D) reports the corresponding cumulative effects.
Rows (a) and (b) illustrate that a productivity shock has a positive and significant treatment
effect on size growth, which provides evidence in favour of the growing by learning hypothesis. High
productivity-growth firms grow on average 1.7% more the year after they increase their productivity
(s = 1). This figure is reduced to 1.2% and 1.0% in the second and third years, respectively. The
effect on size growth is no longer significantly estimated after 4 years of receiving the productivity
shock.
With respect to the GBL cumulative effects, row (b) shows that after 5 years (s = 5), employment
growth of high productivity-growth firms is on average 8.4% higher than non-HPGF firms. According
to these results, a productivity shock at s = 0 causes cumulative size growth to be significantly higher
even after five years (s = 5). Note that the estimated cumulative effects βSh are not equal to the sum
of the pure time effects βsh due to the unbalanced data, i.e.,
∑
s β
s
h = βSh since N varies with s.
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Table 3: Estimated GBL and LBG effects.
s 1 2 3 4 5
(a) Outcome: employment growth
βsGBL 0.017
∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
(b) Outcome: cumulative employment growth
βSGBL 0.017
∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
(c) Outcome: productivity growth
βsLBG 0.017
∗ -0.005 -0.014 -0.008 -0.010
(0.009) (0.005) (0.020) (0.009) (0.014)
(d) Outcome: cumulative productivity growth
βSLBG 0.017
∗ 0.012 0.006 0.012 0.007
(0.009) (0.012) (0.017) (0.008) (0.031)
Notes. s = 1, ..., 5 denotes the time periods after the shock that takes place as s = 0. The number of treated firms
is 14,135 and the number of controls is 5,502 in rows (a) and (b). In rows (c) and (d) the number of treated firms is
12,533 and the number of controls is 5,697. I denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% with ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively.
Standard errors are denoted in parentheses.
The economic magnitude of the estimated GBL effects is also relevant. Consider two identical
firms, A and B, with 60 employees. In a given year (s = 0), firm A receives a productivity shock
while firm B does not. According to the estimates in Table 3, the next year (s = 1) firm A will hire
an additional worker while firm B will not. After 5 years (s = 5), firm A will hire five additional
workers but firm B will not.
Turning to the LBG estimated effects in rows (c) and (d) of Table 3, they provide little support
for the learning by growing hypothesis. To be more concrete, row (c) shows the impact effects of an
employment shock on productivity growth at every period. In the first year (s = 1) the estimated
LBG effect is very similar to the GBL effect in row (a) but it is less precisely estimated being
significant only at the 10% level. However, the impact LBG effect vanishes after one year becoming
even negative albeit not statistically significant.
The cumulative LBG effects reported in row (d) confirm that productivity growth does not
increase after an employment shock. While there is a positive effect during the first year, it is
only significant at the 10% level.11 In any event, the effect of employment growth on cumulative
productivity growth is not statistically significant after the first year, which confirms that size growth
cause no effect on productivity growth.
11Note that cumulative and impact effects coincide in the first year (s = 1).
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Finally, Figure 4 illustrates the main findings. The estimated impact and cumulative GBL —
growing by learning— effects are positive during 5 years after the shock. In particular, the impact
GBL effect is decreasing while the GBL cumulative effect increases over time. In contrast, the learning
by growing (LBG) effects are even negative on impact and roughly zero in cumulative terms.
Figure 4: Estimated GBL and LBG effects
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Notes. The solid line plot the estimated growing by learning (GBL) effects. The dashed line plots the learning by
growing (LBG) effects. The left panel shows the cumulative effect (βSh ) on either employment (GBL) or productivity
(LBG) growth while the right panel shows impact effects (βsLBG).
I interpret these opposing findings as conclusive evidence that productivity growth does cause firm
growth, whereas firm growth does not cause productivity growth. The identification assumptions
required for a causal interpretation of the GBL effects alone might be controversial. In particular,
I need to assume that control and treated firms are identical prior to the productivity shock. How-
ever, I can only make them comparable in terms of the observable characteristics included in the
propensity score while they might well differ in other non-observable dimensions. Analogously, the
same concern applies to the causal interpretation of the LBG effects. The fact that the effect is
positive and significant only in one direction (from productivity to size growth) indicates that the
causal interpretation of my GBL estimates is not sharply at odds with the data.
4.3 Robustness Analysis
In this section I perform several robustness exercises. In particular, these robustness checks are
related to the definition of high growth firms, the matching methodology and the inclusion of financial
variables. First, in the baseline a firm is labeled as a high growth firm if its productivity (or size)
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growth is above an annual growth rate above 10%, which roughly corresponds to the 75th percentile.
Second, in the baseline the matching is based on the method of the nearest neighbor, which selects
the non high growth firms with the closest propensity score. I consider below different definitions
of high growth firms as well as different matching techniques to investigate the robustness of the
baseline results. Third, I re-estimate the baseline specification and consider the asymptotic standard
errors derived in Abad´ıe and Imbens (2016), which take into account the estimation error in the
propensity score. Fourth, I include the firms’ cash-flow among the control variables in the matching
to ensure that differences in firm’s liquidity do not bias the baseline estimates.
4.3.1 Alternative HGF Definitions
The criterion for defining a high-growth firm (in terms of both size and productivity) determines the
treatment and control groups. Therefore, it represents an assumption that might have non-negligible
effects on the estimates. In my baseline results HGF firms are those with productivity (or size)
annual growth above 10% that result in a control and treatment groups satisfying the balancing
hypothesis.12 Standard definitions of high-growth firms (HGF) in terms of employment are based on
multi-period criteria more stringent than the one in my baseline estimates. For instance, the OECD
labels as HGF a firm with average employment growth above 20% per year over a three-year period;
also, the firm must have 10 or more employees. I cannot consider this type of definition because the
resulting groups of treated and control firms do not satisfy the the balancing hypothesis, which is
crucial for ensuring the validity of the matching estimates. Therefore, for the robustness exercises I
consider two alternative definitions with alternative thresholds for the annual growth rate (in terms
of both productivity —GBL— and employment —LBG—). In particular, I consider thresholds of
8% and 12% which roughly correspond to the 70th and 80th percentiles, respectively.
Table 4 shows the estimated GBL and LBG effects in cumulative terms under the labels HGF
8% and HGF 12%. As in the baseline results, GBL effects are highly significant and present similar
magnitudes. If if consider a threshold above 12% (such as 20%, which corresponds to the 90th
percentile), the balancing hypothesis is not satisfied. Thresholds below 8% (e.g. 4%) correspond to
lower percentiles (around 55th) so that the identification of a size/productivity shock is less clear-cut
and the HGF labeling becomes more controversial.13
The overlapping between HGF in size and productivity represents another concern related to the
definition of high growth firms. In particular, 18% of high growth firms in terms of productivity are
also high growth firms in terms of size. Analogously, 16% of HGF in size are also HGF in productivity.
12In particular, this assumption requires that for a given propensity score pi, exposure to treatment is random and
thus treated and control units should be on average observationally identical (see Becker and Ichino (2002)).
13In any event, the main results remain robust when using the 4% threshold and are available upon request.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 22 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1613
Therefore, the productivity (size) shock considered in the baseline specification might include a
size- (productivity-) shock component. In other words, around on sixth of the firms experiencing
a productivity (size) shock also enjoy a size (productivity) shock, which might contaminate the
baseline estimates of the GBL and LBG effects. Table 4 reports GBL and LBG effects estimated
from a sample that does no include firms that are HGF in terms of both TFP and size.14 The GBL
estimates are even larger in magnitude while the LBG remain statistically insignificant after the
second period, which corroborates the robustness of the baseline estimates to different definitions of
high growth firms.
Table 4: Estimated GBL and LBG effects — Robustness (I).
s 1 2 3 4 5
Panel A: Effect of productivity on cumulative size growth (βSGBL)
HGF 8% 0.022∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
HGF 12% 0.025∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
HGF only TFP 0.046∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Panel B: Effect of size on cumulative productivity growth (βSLBG)
HGF 8% 0.012∗∗ 0.001 -0.015∗ -0.015 -0.011
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
HGF 12% 0.012 0.022 0.004 0.021∗ 0.003
(0.012) (0.016) (0.024) (0.011) (0.039)
HGF only size 0.015∗ 0.015∗ 0.004 0.006 0.013
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014)
Notes. s = 1, ..., 5 denotes the time periods after the shock that takes place as s = 0. HGF 8% refers to high growth
firms defined as those with TFP (or size) growth above 8% in a given year, which corresponds to the 70th percentile
in the sample. HGF 12% identifies firms with TFP (or size) growth above 12%, the 80th percentile. HGF only TFP
(size) refer to high growth firms in terms of productivity (size) but not in terms of size (productivity) — see the main
text for more details. I denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% with ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively. Standard errors are
denoted in parentheses.
4.3.2 Alternative Matching Techniques
The particular technique considered for matching control and treatment firms might also represent
a decision with significant effects on the results. In the baseline estimates, I consider the method
14The estimated effects of the productivity and size shock are positive and strongly significant on employment
growth, and negative and marginally significant on productivity growth.
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of the nearest neighbor as explained in section 4.1. Two alternative methods are explored in the
robustness exercises, kernel and stratification matching. None of the different techniques is ex-ante
superior to the others given the the trade-off between quality and quantity of the matches, but their
joint consideration allows me to assess the robustness of the estimates. Dehejia and Wahba (2002)
provide more details on the different matching methods based on the propensity score.
First, I consider kernel matching in which all treated firms are matched with a weighted average
of all controls using weights that are inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity
scores of treated and controls. In the nearest neighbor method considered in the baseline, for some
treated units the nearest neighbor may have a very different propensity score, and, nevertheless, it
would contribute to the estimation of the treatment effect independently of this difference. This
caveat is addressed by the weighting scheme considered in kernel matching. Second, I consider the
stratification method that consists of dividing the propensity score in intervals such that within each
interval, treated and control units have on average the same propensity score. Then, within each
interval the difference between the average outcomes of the treated and the controls is computed.
The overall effect is obtained as an average of the effects for each block with weights given by the
distribution of treated units across blocks.Note that with this method, some treated units may be
discarded in case no control is available in their block.
Table 5 reports the cumulative GBL and LBG effects estimated when using Kernel and Stratifica-
tion matching techniques. In the case of GBL cumulative effects in Panel A, the estimates are highly
significant and very similar to those in the baseline results based on nearest neighbor matching (see
row (b) of Table 3). Turning to the LBG results in Panel B, the estimated effects are more precisely
estimated than those in the baseline results for the first two years after the size shock (s = 1 and
s = 2). However, the effects completely vanish after the third period (s = 3) as in row (d) of Table
3 based on nearest neighbor matching. All in all, I conclude that the matching technique considered
in the baseline results has no decisive impact on the estimated effects.
4.3.3 Other Robustness Checks
In the baseline results, inference is based on standard errors that ignore the estimation error in the
propensity score. Abad´ıe and Imbens (2016) take into account the fact that the propensity scores
are random variables and are estimated from the data (instead of being constants), and they derive
the adjustment to the large sample variance of the estimated treatment effects. Table 6 reports the
cumulative GBL and LBG effects and their corresponding standard errors estimated when considering
the approach in Abad´ıe and Imbens (2016). In the case of GBL results in Panel A, the estimates
are highly significant and similar to those in the baseline results not accounting for the randomness
of the propensity scores (see row (b) of Table 3). Regarding the LBG results in Panel B, standard
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Table 5: Estimated GBL and LBG effects — Robustness (II).
s 1 2 3 4 5
Panel A: Effect of productivity on cumulative size growth (βSGBL)
Kernel matching 0.020∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Stratification matching 0.015∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Panel B: Effect of size on cumulative productivity growth (βSLBG)
Kernel matching 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.001 0.006 0.002
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
Stratification matching 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.003 0.008 0.009
(0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Notes. s = 1, ..., 5 denotes the time periods after the shock that takes place as s = 0. Kernel and stratification
matching refer to alternative techniques for constructing the control group (see the main text for more details). I
denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% with ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively. Standard errors are denoted in parentheses.
errors are now smaller with respect to the coefficient estimates for the first two years after the size
shock (s = 1 and s = 2). However, the statistical significance of the effects completely vanishes after
the third period (s = 3) as in row (d) of Table 3. I thus conclude that considering the asymptotic
distribution in Abad´ıe and Imbens (2016) has no impact on the conclusions from the baseline results.
The baseline estimates control for selection on observables by including the following firm co-
variates: lagged high growth status, total factor productivity, size, export status, wages, and age.
Financial variables are thus not included in the set of observable characteristics that might corre-
late with the high-growth indicators. However, access to finance may well be correlated with firms’
growth performance in terms of both productivity and employment. If this is the case, a positive
effect from high-growth productivity to employment growth could be driven by differences in the
access to finance. For instance, high-growth episodes may improve firms’ ability to raise funding,
and this improvement would generate employment growth rather than the productivity shock per
se. In order to control for this possibility, we follow Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and in-
clude firms’ cash-flow among the set of firm covariates when performing the matching in the baseline
specification.15 The estimated effects are reported in Table 6 under the label “Access to finance”.
The findings in the baseline specification remain robust to the inclusion of financial variables in the
matching procedure. I can thus conclude that the estimated effect from productivity to employment
growth is not driven by differences in access to finance between control and treated firms.
15Cash-flow is defined as the sum of net income, depreciation, and extraordinary income. Positive cash-flow
indicates that a firm’s liquid assets are increasing, enabling it to settle debts, reinvest in its business, return money to
shareholders, pay expenses and provide a buffer against future financial challenges.
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Table 6: Estimated GBL and LBG effects — Robustness (III).
s 1 2 3 4 5
Panel A: Effect of productivity on cumulative size growth (βSGBL)
Abad´ıe and Imbens (2016) 0.019∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011)
Access to finance 0.016∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Panel B: Effect of size on cumulative productivity growth (βSLBG)
Abad´ıe and Imbens (2016) 0.019∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.003 0.005 0.002
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013)
Access to finance 0.023∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.005 0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.023) (0.032) (0.010)
Notes. s = 1, ..., 5 denotes the time periods after the shock that takes place as s = 0. “Abad´ıe and Imbens (2016)”
refers to the use of the asymptotic standard errors derived in Abad´ıe and Imbens (2016), which take into account
the estimation error in the propensity score. “Access to finance” refers to the inclusion of firms’ cash-flow among the
control variables in the matching to ensure that differences in firm’s financial restrictions do not bias the baseline
estimates. I denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% with ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively. Standard errors are denoted in
parentheses.
5 Discussion
Three empirical facts have been discussed above: (i) large firms are more productive than small
firms; (ii) the direction of causality appears to go from productivity to size as it is usually assumed
in canonical models of firm dynamics; (iii) there are too many small and low-productivity firms in
Spain in comparison with the rest of EU4 countries. A natural interpretation of these findings is
that Spanish firms are smaller because they are less productive. According to the GBL estimates
in section 4, Spanish firms should experience, on average, fewer and/or smaller TFP shocks than
their European counterparts. This lack of productivity increases would result in lower employment
growth rates, and, as a consequence, it would bias the Spanish firm size distribution towards small
firms.
Figure 5 provides evidence in favor of this pattern by illustrating that average productivity growth
at the firm level is substantially lower in Spain than in the remaining EU4 countries. In particular,
TFP growth for firms with 1-9 employees is 8.5 pp. lower in Spain while this difference is 2.4 pp.
for large firms with more than 250 employees.16 The fact that the TFP growth gap is substantially
16Differences if TFP growth between EU4 and Spanish firms are also positive and large for all size categories
according to the COMPNET database.
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larger for small firms is compatible with the larger gap of TFP levels illustrated in Figure 2. Turning
to employment (size) growth, the differences are also positive for all size categories, which means
that Spanish firms grow less than their European counterparts. To be more concrete, the annual
growth rate of EU4 firms is around 2.5 pp. higher than that of Spanish firms. According to my
interpretation, Spanish firms are smaller and less productive mainly because they experience much
smaller productivity shocks that preclude them to thrive.
Figure 5: EU4-Spain difference in annual TFP/size growth
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Notes. Each bar plots the difference measured in percentage points between annual productivity (and size defined by
employment) growth in Spain and average productivity (and size) growth in the remaining EU4 countries (Germany,
France, and Italy). The five size categories reported are: (1) from 1 to 9 employees; (2) from 10 to 19 employees; (3)
from 20 to 49 employees; (4) from 50 to 249 employees; (5) more than 250 employees. The source of TFP growth
is AMADEUS over the period 2004-2012 (see Section 3 for more details) while size growth figures are taken from
EUROSTAT over the period 2002-2013. All the figures refer to the total economy including manufacturing, trade,
construction and services.
This interpretation raises an obvious and crucial question. Why do Spanish firms are less pro-
ductive than their European counterparts? Syverson (2011) provides an in-depth overview of the
literature on the determinants of productivity at the firm level. Managerial talent, quality of inputs,
and R&D activities are identified as internal drivers of measured productivity differences across pro-
ducers. Cross-country evidence reveals that Spanish firms perform worse than their EU4 counterparts
in all the three factors, which may explain, at least partially, their dismal performance in terms of
productivity.
Managerial talent represents an obvious lever that can impact the productivity of a firm. Indeed,
management can be interpreted as an unmeasured input in the production function. Managers
coordinate the application of labor, capital, and intermediate inputs, which determines the ability of
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the firm to convert inputs into output. Data limitations have precluded the measuring of managerial
talent across firms and countries until the World Management Survey (WMS) was released a decade
ago. Bloom and Reenen (2007) and their team collected plant-level management practices data
across multiple sectors and countries. The measured practices revolve around day-to-day and close-
up operations on eighteen specific management practices in operations, monitoring, targets, and
incentives. According to the latest release of the survey, in a scale from 1 to 5 the average score of
Spanish firms was 2.75. This figure was 3.18, 3.00, and 2.95 in the cases of Germany, France, and
Italy, respectively (see Bloom, Lemos, Sadun, Scur, and Reenen (2014)). To gauge the magnitude of
these differences, which are economically important, note that the highest score, 3.29, corresponds to
the US, while the lowest, 2.03, corresponds to Mozambique. I argue that poor managerial practices
in Spanish firms may partially explain their low productivity. In fact, Bloom and Reenen (2007)
show that the lower average management practice scores in some developing countries are driven
by a large left tail of very poorly management practices, which goes in line with the larger gap in
productivity of small Spanish firms with respect to EU4 firms.
The productive effects of innovation, information technology, and research and development
(R&D) have been the subject of intense study. For instance, Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013)
find that R&D explains a substantial amount of productivity growth using a panel of Spanish firms,
and they also develop a model in which firm productivity growth is the result of R&D expenditures
with uncertain outcomes.17 While R&D expenditures is only one of the many components of firms’
innovative efforts, it is easy to measure. Indeed, cross-country statistics indicate that gross domestic
expenditure on R&D is substantially lower in Spain than in other European countries. Over the
years 2003-2014, the average R&D expenditure as a share of GDP was 1.22% in Spain, and 1.17%,
2.14%, and 2.63% in Italy, France, and Germany, respectively. On the other hand, the share of
innovative firms is 33.6% in Spain according to EUROSTAT. However, this figure is 56.1%, 53.4%,
and 66.9% in Italy, France, and Germany, respectively.18 It seems reasonable to think that the low
innovative content of Spanish firms may also explain part of their productivity gap with respect to
their European counterparts.
Standard input measures such as the number of employees or employee-hours do not capture
differences in input quality. However, there exists a broad literature based on matched employer-
employee datasets that documents the importance of labor quality as a driver of productivity. For
instance, Ilmakunnas, Maliranta, and Vainioma¨ki (2004) show that workers’ productivity is increasing
in workers’ education. Along these lines, there are reasons to think that Spanish workers are, on
17Rochina-Barrachina, Manez, and Sanchis-Llopis (2010) also find that the implementation of process innovations
produces an extra productivity growth using a panel of Spanish firms.
18The proportion of innovative firms in Spain is also lower by size categories.
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average, less productive than their EU4 counterparts. In particular, data from The Programme for
the International Assessment of Adult Competencies —PIAAC— corroborates this concern. The
PIAAC is a worldwide study of cognitive and workplace skills aiming to assess the skills of literacy,
numeracy and problem solving in technology-rich environments among the working-age population
(for more details see OECD (2013)). The average score is 249 in Spain, while it is 249, 258, and 271
in Italy, France, and Germany, respectively. These figures indicate that workplace skills of employees
in Spanish firms are worse on average, which may well result in lower productivity at the firm level.
6 Concluding Remarks
Large firms are more productive than small firms. The levers that firm managers can use to increase
size and productivity are the same, namely, managerial talent, employee quality, and/or innovation.
Therefore, establishing the direction of causality between size and productivity represents a chal-
lenge. This paper investigates this issue by exploiting a bidirectional identification strategy together
with standard matching methods applied to a representative sample of Spanish firms. My results
indicate that productivity growth may cause employment growth. In contrast, size growth defined
by employment does not result in significant productivity gains.
This finding casts doubt on the view that low productivity growth in Spain can be explained by
the presence of too many small firms. In particular, I argue that the low productivity of Spanish firms
with respect to their European counterparts might be at the root of the Spanish size distribution
excessively biased towards small firms rather than the other way around. As a consequence, the low
productivity at the firm level could also explain the dismal evolution of aggregate productivity in
Spain. According to my own interpretation of the literature and the international evidence, poor
managerial talent, low quality of the labor input, and scarce R&D activities by Spanish firms may
explain, at least partially, their dismal performance in terms of productivity.
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A Measuring firm-level TFP
In order to obtain firm-level total factor productivity (TFP), I resort to relatively standard estimation
techniques, namely, the Wooldridge (2009) GMM approach to implement the Olley and Pakes (1996)
and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) identification strategy.
The object of interest is the TFP of firm i in year t, labeled as ait in the following equation
derived from a firm-specific Cobb-Douglas production function:
yit = αLlit + αKkit + αMmit + ait (5)
where y refers to logged output, and l, k, andm are logged labour, capital, and materials, respectively.
The estimation of equation (5) is performed on a 2-digit industry level. However, in order to obtain
consistent estimates with sufficient degrees of freedom, a cutoff of a minimum of 25 observations per
sector and year is introduced. Sectors that do not meet the minimum cutoff are flagged and their
TFP estimates are replaced by an estimated value obtained on the corresponding macro-sector level.
A full set of year dummies is included to control for sector-specific trends.
To estimate the parameters in the production function, I assume that ait is the sum of two firm-
specific and unobserved components, namely, a component which is known to the firm (ωit), and
a component unknown to the firm and with no impact on firm’s decisions (vit). The endogeneity
problem that renders OLS estimates biased when estimating equation (5) arises from the correlation
of ωit with the input choices. One of the solutions provided for solving this problem is introduced
by Olley and Pakes (1996) who proposed a structural approach to the problem, by using observed
input choices to instrument for unobserved productivity. In particular, their approach relied upon
the assumption that investment, iit, installed in period t only becomes productive at t + 1, so
that iit = i(ωit; kit) can be inverted to yield ωit = ω(iit; kit) under the assumption of increasing
monotonicity of iit in ωit.
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) argued that the strict monotonicity of the investment function was
broken given the many zeros reported by firms. If all observations with zero or negative investment
had to be dropped, there would be an important efficiency loss in the estimation. Therefore, Levin-
sohn and Petrin (2003) advocate to invert the materials’ demand function mit = m(ωit; kit) to obtain
ωit = ω(mit; kit), also under monotonicity plus some additional assumptions. Finally, Wooldridge
(2009) introduces an appealing GMM approach that implements this identification strategy reducing
the computational burden as well as producing more efficient estimates.
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B Additional Figures
Figure B.1: Size distribution of firms, 1995-2007
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Notes. Panel (a) plots the percentage number of firms with 1-9 workers and 10-199 workers both for our sample from
the Central de Balances (CB) and for the census from the Central Business Register (CBR). Panel (b) does the same
for firms with 200+ employees. Panels (c) and (d) report the employment shares in the same size categories.
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Figure B.2: Spain-to-EU4 productivity ratio by firm size and sector
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Notes. Each bar plots the ratio of average productivity in Spain to average productivity in the remaining EU4
countries (Germany, France, and Italy). The five size categories reported are: (1) from 1 to 9 employees; (2) from 10
to 19 employees; (3) from 20 to 49 employees; (4) from 50 to 249 employees; (5) more than 250 employees. Labor
productivity figures cover the period 2002-2013 in the case of EUROSTAT and the year 2010 in the case of the OECD.
Total factor productivity ratios from AMADEUS and COMPNET refer to the period 2004-2012.
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Figure B.3: Size shock at s = 0 and subsequent TFP growth
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Notes. HSG firms are those with employment growth above 10% in 2003, labeled as
s = 0. The remaining firms are labeled as “No HSG” in the same year. The vertical axis
plots average log TFP for these two different groups before and after 2003.
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